Monte Cassino oder Montecassino steht für: Monte Cassino (Antarktika), Berg im Viktorialand, Antarktika; Abtei Montecassino, Benediktinerkloster in Italien. Die Abtei Monte Cassino wurde im 6. Jahrhundert vom Heiligen Benedikt gestiftet. Im Zweiten Weltkrieg war sie eine Schlüsselstellung der deutschen. Nach bereits mehrmaligem Vorbeifahren am Montecassino zu unserem Urlaubsdomizil, haben wir uns zu einem Zwischenstop entschlossen. Wunderschöne.
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Biluthyrning Hitta flyg Restaurangbokningar Booking. Logga in och recensera. Excellent observation from the peaks of several hills allowed the German defenders to detect Allied movement and direct highly accurate artillery fire, preventing any northward advance.
Running across the Allied line was the fast flowing Rapido River , which rose in the central Apennine Mountains , flowed through Cassino joining to the Gari River , which was erroneously identified as the Rapido  and across the entrance to the Liri valley.
There the Liri river joined the Gari to form the Garigliano River, which continued on to the sea. With its heavily fortified mountain defences, difficult river crossings, and valley head flooded by the Germans, Cassino formed a linchpin of the Gustav Line, the most formidable line of the defensive positions making up the Winter Line.
Nevertheless, some Allied reconnaissance aircraft maintained they observed German troops inside the monastery. While this remains unconfirmed, it is clear that once the monastery was destroyed it was occupied by the Germans and proved better cover for their emplacements and troops than an intact structure would have offered.
The British 46th Infantry Division was to attack on the night of 19 January across the Garigliano below its junction with the Liri in support of the main attack by U.
The main central thrust by the U. II Corps would commence on 20 January with the U. In truth, Clark did not believe there was much chance of an early breakthrough,  but he felt that the attacks would draw German reserves away from the Rome area in time for the attack on Anzio codenamed Operation Shingle where the U.
VI Corps British 1st and U. Lucas , was due to make an amphibious landing on 22 January. Whilst this would have been consistent with the German tactics of the previous three months, Allied intelligence had not understood that the strategy of fighting retreat had been for the sole purpose of providing time to prepare the Gustav line where the Germans intended to stand firm.
The intelligence assessment of Allied prospects was therefore over-optimistic. However, because the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff would only make landing craft available until early February, as they were required for Operation Overlord , the Allied invasion of Northern France , Operation Shingle had to take place in late January with the coordinated attack on the Gustav Line some three days earlier.
The first assault was made on 17 January. Near the coast, the British X Corps 56th and 5th Divisions forced a crossing of the Garigliano followed some two days later by the British 46th Division on their right causing General Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin , commander of the German XIV Panzer Corps , and responsible for the Gustav defences on the south western half of the line, some serious concern as to the ability of the German 94th Infantry Division to hold the line.
There is some speculation [ by whom? The corps did not have the extra men, but there would certainly have been time to alter the overall battle plan and cancel or modify the central attack by the U.
II Corps to make men available to force the issue in the south before the German reinforcements were able to get into position. As it happened, Fifth Army HQ failed to appreciate the frailty of the German position and the plan was unchanged.
The two divisions from Rome arrived by 21 January and stabilized the German position in the south. The central thrust by the U.
Walker , commenced three hours after sunset on 20 January. The lack of time to prepare meant that the approach to the river was still hazardous due to uncleared mines and booby traps and the highly technical business of an opposed river crossing lacked the necessary planning and rehearsal.
The southern group was forced back across the river by mid-morning of 21 January. Major General Keyes, commanding the U.
Once again the two regiments attacked but with no more success against the well dug-in 15th Panzergrenadier Division: The st Infantry Regiment also crossed in two battalion strength and, despite the lack of armoured support, managed to advance 1 kilometre 0.
However, with the coming of daylight, they too were cut down and by the evening of 22 January the st Infantry Regiment had virtually ceased to exist; only 40 men made it back to the Allied lines.
Rick Atkinson described the intense German resistance:. Artillery and Nebelwerfer drumfire methodically searched both bridgeheads , while machine guns opened on every sound GIs inched forward, feeling for trip wires and listening to German gun crews reload On average, soldiers wounded on the Rapido received "definitive treatment" nine hours and forty-one minutes after they were hit, a medical study later found The assault had been a costly failure, with the 36th Division losing 2,  men killed, wounded and missing in 48 hours.
The next attack was launched on 24 January. Ryder spearheading the attack and French colonial troops on its right flank, launched an assault across the flooded Rapido valley north of Cassino and into the mountains behind with the intention of then wheeling to the left and attacking Monte Cassino from high ground.
Whilst the task of crossing the river would be easier in that the Rapido upstream of Cassino was fordable, the flooding made movement on the approaches each side very difficult.
On the right, the Moroccan -French troops made good initial progress against the German 5th Mountain Division , commanded by General Julius Ringel , gaining positions on the slopes of their key objective, Monte Cifalco.
General Juin was convinced that Cassino could be bypassed and the German defences unhinged by this northerly route but his request for reserves to maintain the momentum of his advance was refused and the one available reserve regiment from 36th Division was sent to reinforce 34th Division.
The two Moroccan-French divisions sustained 2, casualties in their struggles around Colle Belvedere. It became the task of the U. They could then break through down into the Liri valley behind the Gustav Line defences.
It was very tough going: Digging foxholes on the rocky ground was out of the question and each feature was exposed to fire from surrounding high points.
The ravines were no better since the gorse growing there, far from giving cover, had been sown with mines, booby-traps and hidden barbed wire by the defenders.
The Germans had had three months to prepare their defensive positions using dynamite and to stockpile ammunition and stores.
There was no natural shelter and the weather was wet and freezing cold. An American squad managed a reconnaissance right up against the cliff-like abbey walls, with the monks observing German and American patrols exchanging fire.
However, attempts to take Monte Cassino were broken by overwhelming machine gun fire from the slopes below the monastery. Despite their fierce fighting, the 34th Division never managed to take the final redoubts on Hill known to the Germans as Calvary Mount , held by the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Parachute Regiment , part of the 1st Parachute Division , the dominating point of the ridge to the monastery.
On 11 February, after a final unsuccessful 3-day assault on Monastery Hill and Cassino town, the Americans were withdrawn. II Corps, after two and a half weeks of torrid battle, was fought out.
The performance of the 34th Division in the mountains is considered to rank as one of the finest feats of arms carried out by any soldiers during the war.
At the height of the battle in the first days of February von Senger und Etterlin had moved the 90th Division from the Garigliano front to north of Cassino and had been so alarmed at the rate of attrition, he had " At the crucial moment von Senger was able to throw in the 71st Infantry Division whilst leaving the 15th Panzergrenadier Division whom they had been due to relieve in place.
During the battle there had been occasions when, with more astute use of reserves, promising positions might have been turned into decisive moves.
Some historians [ who? However, it is more likely that he just had too much to do, being responsible for both the Cassino and Anzio offensives.
VI Corps under heavy threat at Anzio, Freyberg was under equal pressure to launch a relieving action at Cassino. Once again, therefore, the battle commenced without the attackers being fully prepared.
This was evidenced in the writing of Maj. Howard Kippenberger , commander of New Zealand 2nd Division, after the war,. Poor Dimoline Brigadier Dimoline , acting commander of 4th Indian Division was having a dreadful time getting his division into position.
I never really appreciated the difficulties until I went over the ground after the war. Success would pinch out Cassino town and open up the Liri valley.
Freyberg had informed his superiors that he believed, given the circumstances, there was no better than a 50 per cent chance of success for the offensive.
Increasingly, the opinions of certain Allied officers were fixed on the great abbey of Monte Cassino: The British press and C.
Sulzberger of The New York Times frequently and convincingly and in often manufactured detail wrote of German observation posts and artillery positions inside the abbey.
Eaker accompanied by Lieutenant General Jacob L. II Corps also flew over the monastery several times, reporting to Fifth Army G-2 he had seen no evidence that the Germans were in the abbey.
There is no clear evidence it was, but he went on to write that from a military point of view it was immaterial:. If not occupied today, it might be tomorrow and it did not appear it would be difficult for the enemy to bring reserves into it during an attack or for troops to take shelter there if driven from positions outside.
It was impossible to ask troops to storm a hill surmounted by an intact building such as this, capable of sheltering several hundred infantry in perfect security from shellfire and ready at the critical moment to emerge and counter-attack.
Undamaged it was a perfect shelter but with its narrow windows and level profiles an unsatisfactory fighting position. Smashed by bombing it was a jagged heap of broken masonry and debris open to effective fire from guns, mortars and strafing planes as well as being a death trap if bombed again.
On the whole I thought it would be more useful to the Germans if we left it unbombed. Major General Francis Tuker , whose 4th Indian Division would have the task of attacking Monastery Hill, had made his own appreciation of the situation.
In the absence of detailed intelligence at Fifth Army HQ, he had found a book dated in a Naples bookshop giving details of the construction of the abbey.
In his memorandum to Freyberg he concluded that regardless of whether the monastery was currently occupied by the Germans, it should be demolished to prevent its effective occupation.
He also pointed out that with foot 45 m high walls made of masonry at least 10 feet 3 m thick, there was no practical means for field engineers to deal with the place and that bombing with "blockbuster" bombs would be the only solution since 1, pound bombs would be "next to useless".
On 11 February , the acting commander of 4th Indian Division, Brigadier Harry Dimoline , requested a bombing raid. Tuker reiterated again his case from a hospital bed in Caserta, where he was suffering a severe attack of a recurrent tropical fever.
Freyberg transmitted his request on 12 February. The request, however, was greatly expanded by air force planners and probably supported by Ira Eaker and Jacob Devers, who sought to use the opportunity to showcase the abilities of U.
Army air power to support ground operations. Clark of Fifth Army and his chief of staff Major General Alfred Gruenther remained unconvinced of the "military necessity".
When handing over the U. Butler, deputy commander of U. All the fire has been from the slopes of the hill below the wall". In all they dropped 1, tons of high explosives and incendiary bombs on the abbey, reducing the entire top of Monte Cassino to a smoking mass of rubble.
Between bomb runs, the II Corps artillery pounded the mountain. Eaker and Devers watched; Juin was heard to remark " That same afternoon and the next day an aggressive follow-up of artillery and a raid by 59 fighter bombers wreaked further destruction.
The German positions on Point above and behind the monastery were untouched. Damningly, the air raid had not been coordinated with ground commands and an immediate infantry follow-up failed to materialize.
Its timing had been driven by the Air Force regarding it as a separate operation, considering the weather and requirements on other fronts and theaters without reference to ground forces.
Many of the troops had only taken over their positions from U. II Corps two days previously and besides the difficulties in the mountains, preparations in the valley had also been held up by difficulties in supplying the newly installed troops with sufficient material for a full-scale assault because of incessantly foul weather, flooding and waterlogged ground.
It is certain from every investigation that followed since the event that the only people killed in the monastery by the bombing were Italian civilians seeking refuge in the abbey.
However, given the imprecision of bombing in those days it was estimated that only 10 per cent of the bombs from the heavy bombers, bombing from high altitude, hit the monastery bombs did fall elsewhere and killed German and Allied troops alike, although that would have been unintended.
Clark was doing paperwork at his desk. On the day after the bombing at first light, most of the civilians still alive fled the ruins.
Only about 40 people remained: After artillery barrages, renewed bombing and attacks on the ridge by 4th Indian Division, the monks decided to leave their ruined home with the others who could move at The old abbot was leading the group down the mule path toward the Liri valley, reciting the rosary.
After they arrived at a German first-aid station, some of the badly wounded who had been carried by the monks were taken away in a military ambulance.
After 3 April, he was not seen anymore. It is now known that the Germans had an agreement not to use the abbey for military purposes. The assault failed, with the company sustaining 50 per cent casualties.
The following night the Royal Sussex Regiment was ordered to attack in battalion strength. There was a calamitous start. Artillery could not be used in direct support targeting point because of the proximity and risk of shelling friendly troops.
It was planned therefore to shell point which had been providing supporting fire to the defenders of point The topography of the land meant that shells fired at had to pass very low over Snakeshead ridge and in the event some fell among the gathering assault companies.
After reorganising, the attack went in at midnight. The fighting was brutal and often hand to hand, but the determined defence held and the Royal Sussex battalion was beaten off, once again sustaining over 50 per cent casualties.
Over the two nights, the Royal Sussex Regiment lost 12 out of 15 officers and out of men who took part in the attack.
On the night of 17 February the main assault took place. This latter was across appalling terrain, but it was hoped that the Gurkhas , from the Himalayas and so expert in mountain terrain, would succeed.
This proved a faint hope. Once again the fighting was brutal, but no progress was made and casualties heavy. It became clear that the attack had failed and on 18 February Brigadier Dimoline and Freyberg called off the attacks on Monastery Hill.
The intention was to take a perimeter that would allow engineers to build a causeway for armoured support. Their isolation and lack of both armoured support and anti-tank guns made for a hopeless situation, however, when an armoured counter-attack by two tanks came in the afternoon on 18 February.
It had been very close. The Germans had been very alarmed by the capture of the station and from a conversation on record between Kesselring and Tenth Army commander Gen.
For the third battle, it was decided that whilst the winter weather persisted, fording the Garigliano river downstream of Cassino town was an unattractive option after the unhappy experiences in the first two battles.
The "right hook" in the mountains had also been a costly failure and it was decided to launch twin attacks from the north along the Rapido valley: The idea was to clear the path through the bottleneck between these two features to allow access towards the station on the south and so to the Liri valley.
British 78th Infantry Division , which had arrived in late February and placed under the command of New Zealand Corps, would then cross the Rapido downstream of Cassino and start the push to Rome.
None of the Allied commanders were very happy with the plan, but it was hoped that an unprecedented preliminary bombing by heavy bombers would prove the trump.
Three clear days of good weather were required and for twenty one successive days the assault was postponed as the troops waited in the freezing wet positions for a favourable weather forecast.
Matters were not helped by the loss of Major General Kippenberger, commanding 2 New Zealand Division, wounded by an anti-personnel mine and losing both his feet.
He was replaced by Brigadier Graham Parkinson; a German counter-attack at Anzio had failed and been called off. The third battle began 15 March.
After a bombardment of tons of 1,pound bombs with delayed action fuses,  starting at The bombing was not concentrated — only 50 per cent landed a mile or less from the target point and 8 per cent within 1, yards but between it and the shelling about half the paratroopers in the town had been killed.
Torrents of rain flooded bomb craters, turned rubble into a morass and blotted out communications, the radio sets being incapable of surviving the constant immersion.
The dark rain clouds also blotted out the moonlight, hindering the task of clearing routes through the ruins. However, the Germans were still able to reinforce their troops in the town and were proving adept at slipping snipers back into parts of the town that had supposedly been cleared.
On 20 March Freyberg committed elements of 78th Infantry Division to the battle; firstly to provide a greater troop presence in the town so that cleared areas would not be reinfiltrated by the Germans and secondly to reinforce Castle Hill to allow troops to be released to close off the two routes between Castle Hill and Points and being used by the Germans to reinforce the defenders in the town.
However, the defenders were resolute and the attack on Point to block the German reinforcement route had narrowly failed whilst in the town Allied gains were measured only house by house.
On 23 March Alexander met with his commanders. A range of opinions were expressed as to the possibility of victory but it was evident that the New Zealand and Indian Divisions were exhausted.
Freyberg was convinced that the attack could not continue and he called it off. The Allied line was reorganised with the exhausted 4th Indian Division and 2nd New Zealand Division withdrawn and replaced respectively in the mountains by the British 78th Division and in the town by British 1st Guards Brigade.
The German defenders too had paid a heavy price. With the arrival of the spring weather, ground conditions were improved and it would be possible to deploy large formations and armour effectively.
The plan for Operation Diadem was that U. II Corps on the left would attack up the coast along the line of Route 7 towards Rome.